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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
magistrate would be put to the choice of setting bail at a figure under
the statutory sum, or waiting for the time when three judges could
hear the application, the suggestion is indeed worthy of consideration.
Rather than extend the contempt power of the court to prevent
"bail jumping" by defendants bonded by irresponsible sureties, it is
suggested that "bail jumping" statutes, similar to the New York stat-
ute, be considered. 84
The various systems of bail procedure throughout the nation
suggest themselves as "experimental laboratories," to aid in the de-
velopment of flexible, constantly improving methods of securing the
attendance of defendants at trial. It would be remiss to ignore this
vast proving ground.
A
EQUITABLE MORTGAGES-A WAVERING DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK
Introduction
The munificence of equity is perhaps best exemplified by the
evolution therein of the law of mortgages. At common law, a mort-
gage was to all intent and purposes a conveyance of the legal estate,
subject to defeasance only if the mortgagor repaid the debt on a pre-
scribed day; failure to comply on that date vested absolute title in
the mortgagee.' To relieve against grievous hardships resulting to
mortgagors in many instances, equity developed a distinct theory of
mortgages, based on the ancient maxim that equity regards the sub-
stance rather than the form, and will relieve against forfeitures when-
ever the party can be fairly compensated by an award of money.
The mortgagor was given a right in equity to redeem the property
even after his default; it is this right to which the abbreviated term
"equity of redemption" refers.
Gradually, the concept arose in equity that certain security
transactions, wherein the debtor pledged his property to the repay-
ment of an obligation, could be effectuated, although title to the prop-
erty did not pass to the creditor. No legal right existed in the
creditor; merely an equitable right, in personam, to compel the debtor
to apply the subject of security to the debt. This form of security
transaction has come to be known as an equitable mortgage.2
184 New York is the only state making bail jumping a crime. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 127 n. 97 (1947).
14 PommRoY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE § 1179 (5th ed. 1941).
2 See Note, 20 COL. L. REV. 519, 520 (1920) ; Walsh, Equitable Mortgages,
9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 429 (1932).
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Generally, whenever the intent to create a mortgage is mani-
fested it constitutes a mortgage in equity, without regard to the form
of the agreement.3 Equitable mortgages result from myriad trans-
actions, 4 and chattels r as well as realty may be the subject of the
charge.
It is the purpose here to discuss one method of creating an
equitable mortgage, i.e., by the deposit of title deeds, to point up its
ramifications, and general acceptance in the various jurisdictions and
New York in particular.
Equitable Mortgage by Deposit of Title Deeds or Other Muniments
of Title
The origin of the doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of
title deeds or other muniments of title is generally attributed to the
early English decision of Russel v. Russel.6 The significance and
effect of this decision is that for the first time the depositor's in-
terest in the property was subjected to an enforceable charge.7 Prior
thereto, the creditor's remedy was limited to his obstinate retention
of the debtor's deeds in an attempt to embarrass the latter into re-
paying the debt. If the debtor brought a possessory action at law
for their recovery, he would not prevail unless he offered to repay
the sum for which the deeds were deposited; or if he sued in equity,
he had to do equity, with the same result.3
The practice of securing loans by depositing title deeds was, at
that time, customary 9 and convenient for small and short term com-
3 Cf. Sullivan v. Corn Exchange Bank, 154 App. Div. 292, 139 N. Y. Supp.
97 (2d Dep't 1912) ; Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 114, 38 N. E. 1000,
1002 (1894). "The whole doctrine of equitable mortgages is founded upon
that cardinal maxim of equity which regards that as done which has been
agreed to be done, and ought to have been done." See 3 U. OF CN. L. REv. 88
(1929).
In certain instances, equity will imply an intent where none exists, creat-
ing an equitable lien to relieve against hardships. The vendor's and vendee's
liens are examples. See Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of
the Problem, 8 N. C. L. Rav. 388, 393 (1930).
4 See Note, 31 CoL. L. REv. 1335 (1931) ; 45 HARv. L. Rrv. 747 (1932).
5 For an excellent article dealing in part with equitable mortgages on chat-
tels, see Note, 20 COL. L. Rav. 519 (1920).
6 1 Brown Ch. C. 269, 270, 28 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1122 (1783). "An issue
was directed to try whether the lease was deposited as security for the sum
advanced by the plaintiff. . . ." The jury found it was deposited as security,
and Lord Thurlow ordered the lease sold and the proceeds applied to plaintiff's
debt.
7 Cf. Ex parte Coming, 9 Ves. Jr. 115, 117, 32 Eng. Rep. 545, 546 (1803).
"I remember, previously to Russel v. Russel it was very much doubted, whether
a mere deposit of deeds constituted an equitable mortgage . . . resting alto-gether upon parol. . . ." See 1 JoNEs, MORTGAGES § 247 (8th ed. 1928); 4
PomEROY, EQuiTn J URISpRuDECE § 1264 (5th ed. 1941).
8 Cf. Keys v. Williams, 3 Y. & C. 55, 60, 160 Eng. Rep. 612, 614 (1838).
But see Brander v. Boles, Prec. Ch. 375, 24 Eng. Rep. 169 (1713).
9 See Gardner v. McClure, 6 Gilf. 167, 171 (Minn. 1861).
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mercial loans. Recognizing the commercial necessities and the prob-
able intention of the parties, the courts created an affirmative lien on
the property encompassed therein, by way of an equitable mortgage. 10
The basis of fact upon which the doctrine took seed and flour-
ished in England was the absence of an extensive system of land
registry." There being no method of permanent recordation of deeds
or similar muniments of title, the possession thereof by the owner
of the estate was essential to prove his title. In contracting for the
sale of his property, he would be compelled to exhibit his title deeds
by a prudent vendee; and in a conveyance of the fee, the title deeds
had to be delivered to the grantee.12 When, therefore, the debtor re-
leased his deeds to the creditor, the mere possession by the creditor
was sufficient to create a presumption that they were deposited as
security, by way of an equitable mortgage. 13 However, the author-
ities were not uniform in this interpretation of the nature of the
transaction, some construing the deposit of deeds with a creditor as
evidence of an agreement by the debtor to execute a legal mortgage 14
with all its remedial incidents.15
In the instances where the deeds were deposited, either with the
creditor or his solicitor 16 for the express purpose of having a legal
mortgage prepared, confusion resulted on the question of whether or
not a present equitable mortgage was created by the deposit. It
10 Russel v. Russel, 1 Brown Ch. C. 269, 28 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1783). Cf.
Keys v. Williams, 3 Y. & C. 55, 60, 160 Eng. Rep. 612, 614 (1838).
11 1 JONES, MORTGAGES § 245 (8th ed. 1928).
12 Walsh, Equitable Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 437 (1932) ; 4 Pom-
EROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1264 n. 13 (5th ed. 1941). Cf. In re Snyder,
138 Iowa 553, 556, 114 N. W. 615 (1908). See Oliver v. Hinton, [1899] 2
Ch. 264.
13 Cf. Ex parte Langston, 17 Ves. Jr. 227, 231, 232, 34 Eng. Rep. 88, 89
(1810). "It has been long settled, that a mere deposit of title-deeds upon
an advance of money, without a word passing, gives an equitable lien ....
-But see Chapman v. Chapman, 13 Beav. 308, 312, 51 Eng. Rep. 119, 120 (1851).
14 For a detailed discussion on the characteristics of a legal mortgage under
the English common law, see 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE § 1179 et
seq. (5th ed. 1941).
15 "The deposit of title-deeds as security for a debt, is now settled to be
evidence of an agreement to make a mortgage, and that agreement is to be
carried into execution by the Court. . . ." Birch v. Ellames, 2 Anst. 427, 145
Eng. Rep. 924 (1794). Cf. Carter v. Wake, 4 Ch. D. 605, 606 (1877). But
see Walsh, Equitable Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 429, 437 (1932).
... [T]hese transactions [deposit of title deeds] involve no agreement to
execute a formal mortgage, and therefore there is a total absence of specific
enforcement of any such contract in the enforcement of these equitable
mortgages. . ..
Is The fact that a deposit is made with a person other than the debtor does
not prevent the equitable mortgage from arising, if the third person acts as
agent or trustee for the mortgagee. See Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De G. & J.
614, 44 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1859), holding that a borrower might deposit his
title deeds with his own solicitor as security. But see Ex Parte Coming, 9
Ves. Jr. 115, 32 Eng. Rep. 545 (1803).
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would appear that the proved intent would negate any presumption
that the deposit itself was meant as a charge on the estate. Ironi-
cally, Lord Thurlow, the original expounder of the doctrine in the
Russel case, in a later decision 17 declared no equitable mortgage ex-
isted in the above situation, while courts, initially critical of the doc-
trine, took a broader view, stating that there should be no distinction
between a deposit for the express purpose of having a security pre-
pared, and a deposit intended to operate as an immediate security.18
The Statute of Frauds
Where the deposit of title deeds was unaccompanied by a writ-
ing setting forth the purpose thereof, a serious question was raised
as to the effect of the doctrine on the Statute of Frauds.19 Though
the equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds is not a contract for the
sale of land, nor a sale of land, but simply a charge or lien on the
land, not recognized in a court of law, nevertheless the power of the
mortgagee to change the ownership of the property by foreclosure
would seem sufficient to bring the doctrine within the policy of the
statute.2 0
The court, in Norris v. Wilkinson,21 fired a verbal broadside at
the doctrine created in Russel v. Russel, stating: "I do not see, why
there should be such a disposition to relieve parties from the neces-
sity of attending to the requisitions of the Statute. There is no case,
where a man is willing to part with his title-deeds, in which he would
not also be ready to sign a memorandum of two lines; specifying the
purpose, for which he had parted with them. By dispensing with
17 Er parte Bulteel, 2 Cox Ch. 243, 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (1790). Lord Thur-
low's view was concurred in by the later decision of Norris v. Wilkinson, 12
Ves. Jr. 192, 33 Eng. Rep. 73 (1806). Compare Brander v. Boles, Prec. Ch.
375, 24 Eng. Rep. 169 (1713).
Is Hockley v. Bantock, 1 Russ. 141, 38 Eng. Rep. 55 (1826). Cf. Edge
v. Worthington, 1 Cox Ch. 211, 212, 29 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1786); Ex parte
Wright, 19 Ves. Jr. 255, 258, 34 Eng. Rep. 513 (1812). Lord Eldon de-
clared that the "deposit of deeds until a mortgage" was evidence of an agree-
ment for a mortgage, and that an "equitable title to a mortgage" was in equity
as good as "legal title."
19 29 CAR. II, c. 3, § 4 (1677). "And be it further Enacted . . .That ...
no Action shall be brought . . . [4] ...upon any Contract or Sale of Lands,
Tenements, or Hereditaments, or Any Interest in or concerning them . . .
[6] unless the Agreement upon which such Action shall be brought, or some
Memorandum or Note thereof shall be in Writing, and signed by the party
to be charged therewith. . .
20 The preamble of the statute recites its purpose to be: "For Prevention
of many Fraudulent Practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld
by Perjury, and Subornation of Perjury." There is just as much opportunity
for perjury to be practiced in stating a mortgage was contemplated by the
deposit of the deeds, as in any other transaction relating to real property. See
Ex parte Whitbread, 19 Ves. Jr. 209, 34 Eng. Rep. 496 (1812).
21 12 Ves. Jr. 192, 197, 198, 33 Eng. Rep. 73, 76 (1806).
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any written evidence of the contract, an opening is left for all the
fraud and perjury, which the Statute was calculated to exclude."
Lord Eldon, in subsequent decisions, opined that the cases es-
tablishing this doctrine approached a virtual judicial repeal of the
Statute of Frauds.22  However, an attempt was subsequently made
to justify the existence of the doctrine on the ground of commercial
expediency, though the court admitted an infraction of the Statute
of Frauds.2
3
The cases establishing the doctrine 24 hold that the mere deposit
of title deeds raises the presumption that it was intended to create
an interest in the land, and in that way there is something greater
than a mere parol agreement; it is something in the nature of a part
performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Although
an advance of money in reliance on an oral agreement that a mort-
gage on real estate will be given is not a sufficient part performance
to escape the bar of the Statute of Frauds, 25 nevertheless it would
seem that a deposit of title deeds would be an act contemplating the
effectuation of that which was promised, and is sufficiently referable
to the parol agreement to be good evidence thereof and to prevent
perjury.
Extent of Security-Deeds to be Deposited and Property Affected
When, in some instances, the deeds deposited were only a part
of those in the depositor's chain of title, the impressment of the
equitable mortgage was resisted by the depositor for that reason.
But the early jurists thought it would greatly curtail the beneficial
effect of the doctrine, based in part on the expediency for small and
short term transactions 26 and the importance of the deeds in English
law,2 7 to require the creditor to obtain from his debtor every deed
relating to the property to effectuate the equitable mortgage. 28 They
22 Ex parte Whitbread, 19 Ves. Jr. 209, 34 Eng. Rep. 496 (1812) ; Ex parte
Hooper; In re Hewett, 19 Ves. Jr. 477, 478, 479, 34 Eng. Rep. 593 (1815).
"With great deference to Lord Thurlow, who first held, that the deposit of a
deed necessarily implied an agreement for a mortgage, I repeat, that this de-
cision has produced considerable mischief;, and that the case of Riusel v.
Russel . . . ought not to have been decided, as it was." See also Ex parte
Kensington, 2 Ves. & B. 79, 35 Eng. Rep. 249 (1813).
23 Cf. Keys v. Williams, 3 Y. & C. 55, 60, 61, 160 Eng. Rep. 612, 614 (1838).
"In commercial transactions it may be frequently necessary to raise money on
a sudden, before an opportunity can be afforded of investigating the title deeds
and preparing the mortgage. Expediency, therefore, as well as necessity, has
contributed to establish the general doctrine, although it may not altogether
be in consistency with the statute."
24 Russel v. Russel, 1 Brown Ch. C. 269, 28 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1783); Keys
v. Williams 3 Y. & C. 55, 160 Eng. Rep. 612 (1838).
25Ii re Beetham; Ex parte Broderick, 18 Q. B. D. 380 (1886).
28 See Roberts v. Croft, 24 Beav. 223, 53 Eng. Rep. 343 (1857). Cf. Keys
v. Williams, 3 Y. & C. 55, 60, 61, 160 Eng. Rep. 612, 614 (1838).
27 See note 12 supra.
28 Lacon v. Allen, 3 Drew. 579, 582, 583, 61 Eng. Rep. 1024, 1025, 1026
(1856). "Then the question is, is it necessary that every title-deed should be de-
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generally required, however, that the deeds deposited be material
evidence of the owner's title, though the determination of their ma-
teriality was seemingly a matter within the discretion of the court
in each case.29
It was generally held that the equitable mortgage created by the
deposit of title deeds presumptively affected all the property encom-
passed by deeds deposited, and prima facie, limited thereto. 30 This
is true, notwithstanding that the depositor falsely asserts that the
deeds actually deposited relate to other or more property.3 ' If dam-
ages result, no doubt the creditor may seek recovery by appropriate
action at law; but certainly a specific enforcement of the agreement
would be a clear violation of the Statute of Frauds.
On the other hand, if a written memorandum accompanies the
deposit of the deeds, limiting or expanding the amount of property
to be affected, then, the resulting equitable mortgage will be corres-
pondingly limited or expanded, although the deeds relate to a greater
or smaller estate than mentioned in the memorandum.32 This is con-
sistent with the expressed intentions of the parties, upon which the
doctrine was originally based.
Extension of the Doctrine-Future Advances
Unlike a legal mortgage, which secures only the original ad-
vance,38 the doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds was
extended to allow, under certain circumstances, the original deposit
and consequential mortgage, to continue as security for future ad-
posited? Suppose the owner had lost an important deed, could he not deposit
the rest? In each case we must judge whether the instruments deposited are
material parts of the title; and, if they are, it is not sufficient to say there are
other deeds material, or even more material, if there is sufficient evidence to
shew that the deposit was made for the purpose of creating a mortgage." See
also Roberts v. Croft, 24 Beav. 223, 53 Eng. Rep. 343 (1857) ; 1 JoNEs, MORT-
GAGES § 248 (8th ed. 1928).
29 See note 28 supra.
30 Ashton v. Dalton, 2 Coll. 565, 63 Eng. Rep. 863 (1846) ; E.r parte Powell;
In re Moore, 6 Jur., Part 1, 490 (1842).
31 Cf. Jones v. Williams, 24 Beav. 47, 55, 53 Eng. Rep. 274, 277 (1857).
"If this view were the law, [that the mortgage lien would affect property not
encompassed by the deed] any deed might be deposited, with an allegation that
it should be held as a deposit to charge any lands which were the property of
the depositors." But see Ex parte Powell; In re Moore, 6 Jur., Part 1, 490
(1842).
32 Dixon v. Muckleston, 8 Ch. 155 (1872). It might be well to note that
it would have been sufficient to create an enforceable equitable mortgage, if
the writing alone were given, indicating a promise or intent to create a mort-
gage, even without an accompanying deposit of title deeds. It was already an
established doctrine of equity, that an agreement to give a mortgage was in
equity a mortgage.
33 See Ex parte Hooper; In re Hewett, 19 Ves. Jr. 477, 34 Eng. Rep. 593
(1815).
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vances made to the mortgagor.3 4 There must, however, be clear
proof of an agreement, written or parol, that the original deposit was
intended to secure the subsequent as well as the present advance, or
that the subsequent advance was made upon a later agreement that
the deposited deeds were to be security for it also.35 It is not neces-
sary, to effectuate the mortgage in the latter situation, that the deeds
be returned to the debtor and by him redeposited,3 6 inasmuch as the
later agreement is equivalent thereto and has the same effect. s7
Priority and Enforcement
The equitable mortgage created by the deposit of title deeds is
superior to all subsequent claims of mere volunteers, and to claims
of those who derive their interest from the depositor, with actual or
constructive notice; but being an equitable charge it may be severed
by a conveyance to a bona fide purchaser.38 Generally, having estab-
lished the mortgage lien by suit in equity, it is enforced, after the
redemption period set by the court 39 has expired, by having the
property sold, and the proceeds applied to the debt.40 However, it
would seem that in those decisions construing the deposit of title
deeds as an agreement to make a legal mortgage with all its rem-
34Ex parte Langston, 17 Ves. Jr. 227, 34 Eng. Rep. 88 (1810).
S5 Ex parte Kensington, 2 Ves. & B. 79, 35 Eng. Rep. 249 (1813) ; Ex parte
Whitbread, 19 Ves. Jr. 209, 34 Eng. Rep. 496 (1812) ; Ex parte Langston, 17
Ves. Jr. 227, 34 Eng. Rep. 88 (1810). It is perhaps singular to note that Lord
Eldon, who was perhaps the greatest critic of the doctrine, was the first to
extend the doctrine to include future advances. However, as he indicated, the
doctrine having been created, the extension followed by logical reasoning.
36Ex parte Hooper; In re Hewett, 19 Ves. Jr. 477, 34 Eng. Rep. 593 (1815).
Compare Ex parte Whitbread 19 Ves. Jr. 209, 34 Eng. Rep. 496 (1812).
37 Ex parte Langston, 17 4Ves. Jr. 227, 34 Eng. Rep. 88 (1810).3 8 Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De G. & J. 614, 44 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1859). But it
is difficult to see how the depositor could effectuate a valid sale or conveyance
thereby severing his creditor's equity. If he failed to produce the deeds at
the proposed sale, the intended purchaser would be put on inquiry to determine
the reason, and would serve as constructive notice to the purchaser, that the
deeds may have been deposited by way of an equitable mortgage. The credi-
tor holding the title deeds is well secured, and it is submitted that the danger
of losing his lien is more apparent than real.
As to what constitutes sufficient notice, see Jones v. Williams, 24 Beav.
47, 53 Eng. Rep. 274 (1857); Bozon v. Williams, 34 Y. & J. 150, 148 Eng.
Rep. 1131 (1829); 2 POmEROY, EQuITY JuRISPRUDENCE § 612 (5th ed. 1941).3 9 In Parker v. Housefield, 2 My. & K. 419, 420, 39 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1834),
the plaintiff sued to obtain immediate benefit of his equitable mortgage. In
allowing the defendant six months in which to redeem, the court said: "Such
being the light in which Courts of Equity view equitable mortgages by de-
posit of title deeds, [i.e., that an equitable title to a mortgage was as good as
a legal mortgage] it would seem to follow that the remedy to be afforded to
such mortgagees should, as nearly as possible, correspond with that to which
legal mortgages are entitled. .... "
40Russel v. Russel, 1 Brown Ch. C. 269, 28 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1783).
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edial incidents,41 an absolute transfer of the estate to the mortgagee
would be effected by strict foreclosure. 42
The Doctrine in the United States
It was perhaps inevitable that the doctrine of equitable mortgage
resulting from the mere deposit of title deeds would be rejected in a
great majority of American jurisdictions.43  The basis of fact ex-
isting in England upon which the doctrine there was able to flourish 44
,was directly opposed to our approved methods of real estate convey-
ancing, and especially to our system of land recordation. 4 The court
in In re Snyder 40 sharply focused this distinction, while rejecting
the application of the doctrine, with the following passage: "Under
our system of registry, however, possession of title deeds is of no
real importance to the owner of the estate. He cannot [sic, can?]
convey the land without them. They are not necessary in order.
to ascertain the condition of the title. . .. ,, 4T Other jurisdic-
tions, with equal vigor, refused to adopt the circumvential Eng-
lish attitude with respect to the relation of the doctrine to the Stat-
ute of Frauds.48 In declaring the deposit of title deeds ineffective
41 See note 15 supra.
4 2 Pryce v. Bury, 2 Drew. 11, 61 Eng. Rep. 622 (1853). Cf. Carter v.
Wake, 4 Ch. D. 605, 606 (1875). ". . . in a regular legal mortgage there has
been an actual conveyance of the legal ownership, and then the Court has in-
terfered to prevent that from having its full effect, and when the ground of
interference is gone by the non-payment of the debt, the Court simply re-
moves the stop it has itself put on."
The doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been
clearly preserved in comparatively recent English legislation, and has appar-
ently been established as a permanent principle in English law. See LAw OF
PROPERTY Acr 1925, c. 20, §§ 13, 40, 15 & 16 GEo. 5, c. 20.
43 Davis v. Harris, 211 Ala. 679, 101 So. 458 (1924); Bloom v. Noggle,
4 Ohio St. 45 (1854). See 19 L. R. A. (x. s.) 206 (1909).
44 See note 11 supra.
45 4 POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1265 (5th ed. 1941). N. Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 291 (recording statute in New York).
46 138 Iowa 553, 556, 114 N. W. 615 (1908).
47 To the same effect is 1 JoNEs, MORTGAGES § 251 (8th ed. 1928); 4 Pom-
EROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1265 (5th ed. 1941). ". . . owners [in the
U. S.] look to the records as furnishing the real evidence of title, and .. .
the true condition of all interests in . . .the land which could effect the rights
of purchasers or incumbrancers . .. even in preference to the original deeds.
In fact, no presumption or inference would . . . be raised from the mere
possession of title deeds by a stranger."
4 The statutory provisions enacted by the several states corresponding to
the original English statute (see note 19 supra) have taken two forms: those
which provide that "no action shall be brought" on any contract for the sale
of land, and those which declare "void" any such contract. See 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRAcTs § 526 n. 6 (Rev. ed. 1936). A typical statute is that of New
York. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259. "A contract for .. . the sale, of any
real property, or an interest therein, is void, unless the contract or some note
or memorandum thereof . . . is in writing. . ."
1952 ]
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to impress a mortgage on the estate of the depositor, the court in
Schitz v. Dieffenback 49 reasoned that the deposit "[b] eing no more
than a parol mortgage, (for it is only by parol that the meaning and
object of such delivery is ascertained), it cannot now be made a ques-
tion ... that there can be no such thing as a valid efficacious parol
mortgage.... a parol mortgage is contrary to the spirit of our legis-
lation in the statute of frauds ......
However, it would seem that if the deeds deposited with the
creditor were not recorded, the same basis of fact would exist as did
in England where no system of registry was available, and so the
objection to the recognition of the doctrine in the United States be-
comes less forceful. The possession of the title deeds by the owner
becomes once more "the badge of ownership." And it has been held,
in such circumstances, that the reasoning of the English decisions
would apply and control. 50
Even in those jurisdictions which have expressly rejected the
English doctrine, it has nevertheless been held that where a written
agreement accompanies a deposit of title deeds, stating the purpose
of the deposit to be security for the debt, it will be given effect as a
mortgage in equity.5' Similarly, it would seem, that although an en-
forceable equitable mortgage on the property does not result from
the deposit of the title deeds, if in fact they were deposited as se-
curity for an obligation, the obligor could not recover them unless
the obligation for which they were deposited is satisfied.
In a few jurisdictions, however, the English doctrine has been
given recognition as a subsisting rule of equity jurisprudence and
acted upon.5 2 But the courts have applied more stringent safeguards
to prevent ambiguity in construing the purpose of the deposit, by re-
fusing to presume a deposit for security.53 Likewise, it has been
held that a debt or obligation must exist at the time the deeds are
493 Pa. 233 (1846).50 Jennings v. Augir, 215 Fed. 658, 661 (W. D. Wash. 1914). "As long as
the deed is unrecorded, and, without fraud on the part of the grantor, returned
to him by the grantee-thus putting it in his power to destroy the same, and
thereby greatly jeopardizing any evidence of rights thereunder, if not render-
ing it impossible for the grantee to establish his title . . . it appears clear
that the reasoning upon which the English cases have been decided would
apply and control." See also Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104 (1866).51 First Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 9 Fed. Cas. 81, No. 4,798 (C. C. D. Neb.
1876) ; Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal. 467, 58 Pac. 907 (1899). But cf. Gardner
v. McClure, 6 Gilf. 167 (Minn. 1861) (holding that a mortgage on real estate
cannot be created by a deposit of title deeds, even though accompanied by a
writing stating the object of the deposit).
52 Bullowa v. Orgo, 57 N. J. Eq. 428, 41 Atl. 494 (1898); Hackett v.
Reynolds, 4 R. I. 512 (1857); Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis. 326 (1862).
53 Cf. Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 284 (U. S. 1820). "But in cases
of this nature [deposit of title deeds], the doctrine proceeds upon the suppo-
sition, that the deposit is clearly established to have been made as security for
the debt;- and not upon the ground that the mere fact of a deposit unex-
plained affords such proof."
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deposited as security, for, notwithstanding the depositor subsequently
incurs an obligation to the depositee, the "equitable mortgage will
not be created to take effect in the future." 54 Where the mortgage
exists, its proper mode of foreclosure seems to be by suit in equity
and a decree for the sale of the affected property,5 as opposed to the
ordinary English remedy of strict foreclosure, cutting off the equity
of redemption., 6
The Doctrine in New York
New York has been listed by text writers and other authorities
as one of the few jurisdictions in which the English doctrine of
equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds has been recognized and
adopted, 57 although some New York courts, seemingly unimpressed,
have been less forceful in declaring the extent of its recognition. 8
The doctrine in New York was given an oblique introduction
and a cursory disposition in the early Supreme Court case of Jackson
v. Dunlap '; decided shortly after its English birth in Russel v.
Russel.60 The suit was one at law for ejectment, both litigants
claiming title from the decedent. The defendant had agreed to pur-
chase the property in question from the decedent, and pursuant there-
to a formal, fully executed, attested and acknowledged deed had been
prepared, but withheld by the decedent until the consideration was
fully paid. Although defendant had made some payments, the de-
cedent in his will devised the property to the plaintiff. In granting
judgment for the plaintiff, Chief justice Lansing found it "not
necessary . . . to enter into the doctrine of equitable mortgages," de-
ciding that there had been no valid delivery of the deed to the de-
fendant.01 The opinion of the Chief Justice indicates by implication
that, in a proper situation, the doctrine would be applied. As a mat-
5 Biebinger v. St. Louis Continental Bank, 99 U. S. 143, 146 (1878) (the
money must be loaned or the debt created "on the faith of the deposit of this
deed").
55 Hackett v. Reynolds, 4 R. I. 512 (1857); Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis.
326, 335 (1862). The equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds is fore-
closed ". . . by suit in equity to establish the lien, and for a sale in case the
principal, interest and costs are not paid on a given day."
56 See note 42 supra.
57 1 JONES, MORTGAGES § 252 (8th ed. 1928); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE § 1265 (5th ed. 1941); Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104 (1866).
58 In Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 74, 142 N. E. 355, 357 (1923), Judge
Cardozo stated: "To what extent, if at all, this form of equitable mortgage
is permitted in New York, is involved in some obscurity."
59 1 Johns. 114 (N. Y. 1799).
60 1 Brown Ch. C. 269, 28 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1783).
61 Generally, a deed is delivered and title passes when the parties intend
that result. Chief Justice Lansing construed the intent of the parties to be
that no estate was to pass to defendant until the full purchase price was paid.
See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1034 et seq. (3d ed. 1939).
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ter of fact, Justice Kent, in a dissenting opinion, considered the de-
livery complete, construing the intent of the parties to be that the
deed ". .. should ... be retained by the grantor by way of security,
till payment," concluding that "[t]his was the creation of an equi-
table lien in the grantor; but such a lien or equitable mortgage can-
not be set up at law, as a legal estate." A subsequent decision, in-
volving, inter alia, similar facts, declared a redelivery of a deed by
the grantee to the grantor by way of security amounted to "an equi-
table lien on the premises in the nature of a mortgage," citing Jackson
v. Dunlop as sole authority.6 2
It was not until 1844, that the applicability of the doctrine was
squarely presented to the New York Chancery court in Rockwell &
Hobby v. Hobby.6 3 The defendant's testator had advanced money to
his mother to discharge a bond and mortgage and upon his death her
unrecorded deed was found among his effects. The purpose of the
deed's deposit with the decedent was involved in some obscurity, each
litigant proposing conflicting reasons. The court, declaring that
"[t] he only inference is, that the deed was deposited as security for
the advance" decreed that an equitable mortgage had thereby been
constituted upon the property encompassed in the deed. It is sig-
nificant to note that the court relied entirely upon the original Eng-
lish cases 04 as precedent, adopting the doctrine therein promulgated
with all its broad ramifications, 63 and without any indication or innu-
endo that the doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds
was inconsistent with the New York registry laws or Statute of
Frauds. If the impelling force behind this decision was the fact that
the deed was unrecorded,66 it was not apparent in the opinion. The
doctrine seemed firmly entrenched in New York jurisprudence. A
subsequent New Jersey decision,67 applying New York law 68 to a
62 Jackson v. Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 369, 376 (N. Y. 1830). The court also
cites the case of Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. 418 (N. Y. 1815), but this case
deals solely with the question of the delivery necessary to effectuate a con-
veyance and does not concern the law of equitable mortgages.
63 2 Sand. Ch. 9 (N. Y. 1844).
64 The court cites: Ex parte Coming, 9 Ves. Jr. 115, 32 Eng. Rep. 545
(1803); Ex parte Wetherell, 11 Ves. Jun. 398, 32 Eng. Rep. 1141 (1805); Ex
parte Langston, 17 Ves. 230, 34 Eng. Rep. 88 (1810) ; Ex parte Kensington, 2
Ves. & B. 79, 35 Eng. Rep. 249 (1813).
65 The court, relying on the English cases (supra note 64), stated that the
mere deposit of title deeds, without more, creates an equitable mortgage.
Moreover, if the deeds were deposited for the purpose of having a formal
mortgage executed, the court stated, an equitable mortgage would attach im-
mediately upon the deposit.
68As was previously noted, some American jurisdictions, though ostensibly
critical of the doctrine's applicability in the United States, have nevertheless
applied it where the deed deposited was unrecorded. See Jennings v. Augir,
215 Fed. 658, 661 (W. D. Wash. 1914).
67 Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104 (1866).
68 The property affected by the deed was situated in New York, and pur-
suant to the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae, the law of New York was held ap-
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situation substantially similar to that in the Hobby case, held the de-
posit of the title deeds with the creditor constituted an equitable
mortgage.
In Chase v. Peck,69 Justice Denio, perhaps to reaffirm the status
of the doctrine in New York law, stated that "[t] he courts of equity
in this state have adopted the general doctrines of the English chan-
cery upon this subject [equitable mortgages], as upon many others.
The cases of a mortgage created ... by a deposit of title deeds, have
not been frequent with us; but the doctrine has been applied in a
few instances, and I do not find any judgment or dictum by which
it has ever been questioned." For several decades, the doctrine con-
tinued to be the unquestioned law of the state, being indirectly re-
inforced in some instances by way of dicta wherever the Statute of
Frauds was unsuccessfully interposed to bar an impressment of an
equitable lien.70 Seemingly, the doctrine of part performance was
more liberally extended in connection with parol contracts to mort-
gage, than with parol contracts for the conveyance of land; 71 and
the mere payment of money in reliance on an oral agreement to give
a mortgage was considered sufficient part performance to prevent
the operation of the statute.7 2 But Justice Cardozo, in Sleeth v.
Sampson,73 attempted to curtail this apparent extension, and to unify
the acts of part performance necessary to remove any parol agree-
plicable. For cases involving the conflict of laws problem, see Fall v. Estin,
215 U. S. 1 (1909) ; Clouse v. Clouse, 185 Tenn. 666, 207 S. W. 2d 576 (1948).
6921 N. Y. 581, 583, 584 (1860). This was the first expression by the
Court of Appeals on the question of the doctrine's applicability, although the
statement was merely dictum.
70 In Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 113, 38 N. E. 1000, 1002 (1894),
it was pointed out that "[t]he doctrine of equitable mortgages is not limited
to written instruments intended as a mortgage . . .but also to a very great
variety of transactions to which equity attaches that character. It is not neces-
sary that such transactions or agreements as to land should be in writing in
order to take them out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds for two
reasons, first, because they are completely executed by at least one of the
parties and are no longer executory, and, secondly, because the statute by its
own terms does not affect the power which courts of equity have always exer-
cised to compel specific performance of such agreements." See also Smith v.
Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891).
71 The part performance necessary to take an oral contract for the con-
veyance of land out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds must be "un-
equivocally referable" to the agreement to convey. Bums v. McCormick, 233
N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922).
72 See note 70 supra.
73 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923). The plaintiff, in this case, advanced
money to defendant's decedent, relying on the latter's oral agreement to execute
a formal mortgage on his property as security. Pursuant to the agreement the
decedent had deposited with the plaintiff his deeds and an abstract of title
saying: "You look these over, and see what you can do, and we will go down
to the lawyer's in a few days and draw this up." Upon decedent's death
shortly thereafter, plaintiff sued those succeeding to decedent's title to specifi-
cally enforce the oral agreement
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ment affecting real property from the operation of the statute,74 ex-
plaining prior decisions on their respective facts, 5 and concluding
that "payment without more does not obviate the necessity for a
writing." 76 It was urged by the plaintiff in the Sampson case that
the title deeds deposited with him by the debtor constituted a part
performance of the latter's agreement to execute a mortgage, suffi-
cient to sustain a decree of specific performance. The court, avoid-
ing the issue, proceeded to cast a doubt on the applicability of the
doctrine of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds stating, "[t] o
what extent, if at all, this form of equitable mortgage is permitted in
New York, is involved in some obscurity." Surprisingly, in support
of this statement, the court cites the Dunlap, Hobby and Peck cases
which have endeavored to dispel any doubt as to the acceptance of
the doctrine.77 Moreover, the court notes that "[e]ven in England
.. . the deposit must have been made for the purpose of creating a
present or immediate security, and not merely as a preliminary step
to the preparation of a mortgage which will be security thereafter."
But as the plaintiff was not seeking to impress an equitable lien on
the property, relying on the deposit of the deeds, but seeking instead
74 Id. at 72, 142 N. E. at 357. "One who promises to make another the
owner of a lien or charge upon land, promises to make him the owner of an
interest in land, and this is the equivalent in effect to a promise to sell him
such an interest."
75 In Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. 1000 (1894), a formal
mortgage had actually been given, but the description of the property therein
did not include the property agreed to be mortgaged, and in Smith v. Smith,
125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259 (1891), the lender went into possession of the
property and made improvements thereon. But the difficulty with the at-
tempted distinction is that in the Cochran case, the formal mortgage which
was executed did not misdescribe the property to be affected, but actually
omitted certain property which was orally agreed to be included as part of the
security. As regards the omitted property, the agreement to give a mortgage
thereon was purely oral, and the court held that the act of advancing money
by the lender was sufficient part performance to relieve him from the bar of
the statute. Also, the Smith case represents the unusual situation where the
mortgagee is married to the mortgagor and makes improvements on the mort-
gaged premises.
76 Professor Walsh, after a review of the applicable New York cases, ex-
presses doubt as to the propriety of this statement in Sleeth v. Sampson, and
concludes that it is "opposed to established law in England and most of the
states in this country as well as in New York." (emphasis added). Walsh,
Equitable Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 429, 440 n. 30 (1932).
77 The court also cites the case of Stoddard v. Hart, 23 N. Y. 556 (1861).
The court in that case only recognizes that "[iln this State the doctrine is
almost unknown, because we have no practice of creating liens in this manner."
But it continues to explain that "[i]f it be specifically agreed to execute a
legal mortgage . . . [tihe deposit of title deeds is evidence of such an agree-
ment." Id. at 561. Thus the court indicates that in a proper situation, the
doctrine would apply in New York. In Bowers v. Johnson, 49 N. Y. 432
(1872), which Justice Cardozo also cites, the court did not express doubt as
to the applicability of the doctrine, but merely concluded that the facts in
the case did not warrant its application.
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specific performance of the debtor's agreement to execute a mortgage,
the expressions of the court relative to the doctrine of equitable
mortgage by deposit of title deeds was clearly dictum. The real
issue, to wit, whether a deposit of title deeds is sufficient part per-
formance of a proven oral agreement to execute a mortgage, so as
to prevent the operation of the Statute of Frauds, was left unan-
swered. The issue was now "involved in some obscurity" where none
had existed before.
The problem was raised again in the comparatively recent case
of Lee v. Beagell.78 There the plaintiff-grantee of certain real estate
had redeposited his unrecorded deed with the grantor as security for
a loan. Upon the failure to repay the loan, the grantor conveyed
the property to the defendant with the same agreement as to repay-
ment by the plaintiff. The plaintiff having failed to pay within the
specified time, the defendant recorded his deed.7 9  Although allow-
ing the plaintiff to redeem the property, the court reflected the ob-
scurity involved in the recognition afforded the doctrine of equitable
mortgage by deposit of title deeds in New York,80 though signifi-
cantly failing to cite the Sampson case among the cases relied upon
as binding. It would seem, therefore, that notwithstanding the am-
biguous decision in the Sampson case, the doctrine will apply in New
York wherever the situation presents itself.
Conclusion
The obviously conflicting bases of fact with reference to land
recordation existing in England and the United States 81 reasonably
accounts for the disparity of emphasis placed by each on the doctrine
of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. However, a common
ground of reconciliation may be suggested. It cannot be questioned
that a deposit of title deeds as security for a debt has some meaning.
It is not an empty gesture, and should create some rights, legal and
equitable, even without an accompanying written agreement. It does,
at the very least, constitute a pledge of the deeds themselves, valid
betveen the parties to the pledge, preventing the depositor from re-
78 174 Misc. 6, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
79 Under the Recording Act in New York, the equitable lien created by a
deposit of title deeds can be effectively cut off by a sale of the premises to a
bona fide purchaser, without notice, and who records his deed. N. Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 291. See Griffin v. Griffin, IS N. J. Eq. 104, 107 (1866).
80 Lee v. Beagell, 174 Misc. 6, 8, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 613, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
"Although the creation of equitable mortgages by the deposit of title deeds
has not been recognized in this State to the extent that it is in England, never-
theless, the courts have not hesitated to utilize this method of attaining justice
when the equities so require."
82 4 POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1264 n. 13 (5th ed. 1941) ; Walsh,
Equitable Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 429, 437 (1932). Cf. In re
Snyder, 138 Iowa 553, 556, 114 N. W. 615 (1908).
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covering them at law or in equity until the debt for which they were
deposited has been discharged. 2 It would be consonant with the
evident intention of the parties if the mere pledge of the deeds with-
out further express agreement were considered in equity a lien on
the property encompassed therein, enforceable as between the parties,
against the property of the debtor. To this extent the deposit may
be effectuated in any jurisdiction and would be in complete harmony
with our established system of recordation and conveyancing. Also,
it should be noted that the English decisions creating the doctrine
assumed a mere deposit of title deeds without any agreement and
implied an agreement to give a mortgage, thereby creating the equi-
table lien. But, if a writing accompanies the deposit stipulating that
it was made by way of security, and intended to create a charge on
the property, then, under the established principles of equity pre-
vailing throughout the United States, the writing itself would con-
stitute an equitable mortgage.8 3 It has never been suggested that
such a transaction conflicts with our system of land registry, and, it
is submitted, such a transaction is substantially the same as the simple
deposit from which the implied intent to give a mortgage was de-
duced. To this extent, therefore, the original English doctrine may
be held to be applicable in our jurisdictions.
It is only where the rights of third parties intervene, that the
efficacy of the doctrine diminishes in the United States. An equi-
table lien created by the deposit of title deeds should not be permit-
ted to operate against subsequent grantees or incumbrancers, even
with actual notice of the deposit, for under our system of registry,
where the record of a deed furnishes the only reliable evidence of
title, no presumption or inference should arise from the mere
possession of the deeds by a stranger. It is therefore submitted, that
unless the rights of third parties intervene, the doctrine of equitable
mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be effectively applied as be-
tween the parties to the deposit, without conflicting with the estab-
lished system of title recordation.
82 See note 8 .supra.
s3 Jennings v. Augir, 215 Fed. 658 (W. D. Wash. 1914); Higgins v. Man-
son, 126 Cal. 467, 58 Pac. 907 (1899) ; Martin v. Bowen, 51 N. J. Eq. 452, 26
AtI. 823 (1893).
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